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BOOK REVIEWS
By Lawrence P. Tiffany,* Donald M. McIntyre,
Jr.,t and Daniel L. Rotenberg.$ Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1967.
Pp. xxx, 286. $10.00.

DETECTION OF CRIME.

This is the first of a series of reports on studies sponsored by the
American Bar Foundation into the administration of criminal justice in
the United States. The full series which will consist of five volumes is
intended to cover the "major stages in criminal justice administration
from the commission of a crime to the offender's discharge from parole
supervision. '
The volume entitled Detection of Crime consists of three essentially
independent reports, the first covering police practices in the area of
interrogation before arrest, the second covering search and seizure, and
the third covering what is designated as police "encouragement" of crime
-a term used to describe the use of pretext investigations in which the
police or their agents falsely pretend to be willing prospective participants in so-called "victimless crimes," namely, those involving prostitution,
homosexuality and illegal traffic in narcotics and liquor. In each section,
the author makes an analysis of existing police practices which will provide the legal profession and the public with an opportunity to evaluate
the usefulness of these techniques for law enforcement purposes, their
compatability with other social interests, and the appropriateness and
effectiveness of existing legal requirements which affect their use. The
study reported in Part 1 is based largely on field research conducted in
the City of Chicago; Parts 2 and 3 are based largely upon investigations
and studies made of police practices in the City of Detroit, but all sections are supplemented by data collected through investigations and
inquiries made in other communities throughout the United States.
The title of the book Detection of Crime is a somewhat misleading
description of the contents. The scope of the study is at once broader
and narrower than the title suggests. The study does not concern itself
generally with police techniques used to solve crimes or to bring criminals
to justice, as the title may suggest. Many aspects of police practices in
the field of crime detection have been excluded from the scope of the
study, as is clearly stated in the Editor's Foreword:
* Assistant Professor of Law and Assistant Dean, University of Denver.

t Supervisor of Research, Survey of the Administration of Criminal Justice in the
United States, American Bar Foundation.
Associate Professor of Law, University of Houston.
1. L. TiFmANY, D. MCINTYRE, JR., D. ROTENBERc, DETECTION OF CRimE, xv (1967).
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This volume discusses three important, current law enforcement detection practices: field interrogation, search and seizure,
and encouragement and entrapment. Obviously, there are other
significant methods of detection, such as surveillance, eavesdropping, infiltration of criminal enterprises by undercover
agents, use of informants, and interviewing victims and complainants. Some of these are given attention in the Arrest volume. Others are not dealt with at all in the series. As to some,
electronic eavesdropping, for example, the omission results from
lack of data sufficient to support a meaningful contribution. As
to others, interviewing victims and complainants, for example,
the omission results from the effort to focus on those detection
methods that give rise to more sharply conflicting value questions. Because field interrogation, search and seizure and encouragement do give rise to important and 2sensitive value questions, they are given priority of treatment.
The scope of the study is thus confined to police practices in the three
areas indicated. Further, it is somewhat misleading to characterize techniques in these areas as crime "detection" practices. As the authors
stress, these techniques-especially field interrogations and search and
seizures-may be pursued as much to prevent criminal conduct as to
effect the arrest and conviction of persons responsible for crimes already
committed. In this sense, police practices in the prevention of crime are
as much within the purview of the study as those related to its detection.
These comments are not intended critically, but rather to emphasize
one of the features of the study which may contribute much to its usefulness to the legal profession, viz., police practices in the three fields
covered are examined not from the narrow viewpoint of the lawyer or
judge concerned only with criminal prosecutions but rather from the
broader perspective of the policeman concerned broadly with maintaining
an acceptable level of public peace and decency in the community. The
arrest and conviction of persons responsible for crimes is but a partand perhaps a relatively small part-of the total area of police responsibility.
In his analysis of field interrogation, Professor Tiffany points out that
in a great many cases the police do not expect or intend to make arrests
or to initiate prosecutions as a result of their interrogations, but rather
desire to discourage or inhibit criminal activity by making the police
"presence" felt. Similarly, as Mr. McIntyre's report shows, frequently
the police will conduct searches or seizures-not with the purpose of
seizing evidence or making arrests-but to discourage criminal enterprises by the paralegal measures of seizing weapons or contraband or by
2. Id.
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making the illegal activity unprofitable. Such police techniques become a
direct mode of law enforcement through crime prevention and are not
pursued as part of an effort to bring about the identification, arrest and
conviction of persons guilty of crimes.
Professor Tiffany, in a thoughtful analysis of actual police practices
in the field, emphasizes the broad spectrum of activity which his subject
encompasses. Thus, the police may question persons merely to let them
know the police have an eye on them, as a means of discouraging vice
practices, to control gangs and juveniles, to control public drinking or
brawling or otherwise to prevent public disturbances, or even incidental
to traffic control. Such interrogation is so far removed from the area of
crime detection as such that Professor Tiffany suggests that it not even
be classified as "field interrogation"-preferring to restrict that term to
questioning employed as an aid to investigation of whether or not to
arrest. Questioning which is calculated primarily to prevent crime or other
undesirable activity, Professor Tiffany labels as "preventive patrol practices." 3
Professor Tiffany makes another useful distinction at the other end
of the spectrum and suggests that the term "field interrogation" should
be further confined to investigative interrogation pursued before the interrogating officer has decided to arrest. Thus, he defines field interrogation as "an investigative device, a stage in the criminal justice system
designed to separate innocent persons from those who should be subjected to the next step in the process, an arrest."4 It seems clear that the
reasonableness and lawfulness of a field interrogation should be governed
by different standards than preventive patrol practices on the one hand,
or interrogation incident to an arrest, on the other. The analysis also
points up the fact that the actual criteria are those formulated by the
police; they vary widely and they have seldom been subjected to scrutiny
by the courts. In the closing chapter of his study, Professor Tiffany
comments on the need for the development of effective standards for
police field interrogation practices and charts a number of inquiries to be
pursued in determining how such standards should be defined and enforced.
Like the rest of the volume, the study of field interrogation does not
purport to be either an exhaustive study of present practices or an evaluation of their propriety. Its principal objective-which it well accomplishes-is to analyze the subject searchingly in order to find-and thus
to permit a start to be made on the solution of-the problems in this area
in which present police practices have been fashioned primarily through
trial and error, without guidance from the courts, the legislatures, or, in
most instances, even from top police officials.
3. I. at 10.
4. Id.
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The formulation of standards for determining the lawfulness of search
and seizure is not a critical need. However, as Part II of the study emphasizes, the problems in this field are not adequately met by standards
directed only to the use of the products of search and seizure in trials of
persons accused of crimes. As Mr. McIntyre points out, the techniques
of search and seizure have many police uses, not all of which are related
to the filing and prosecution of criminal charges.
As with interrogations, the police do not always intend to arrest or
prosecute when a search is made of a person or a place or when contraband is seized. Sometimes the search or seizure is employed as a crimepreventive or crime deterrent technique pursued as an end in itself.
Especially with such crimes as illegal traffic in liquor or drugs, the seizure
of contraband may inflict substantial economic loss on the enterprise; it
directly prevents further traffic in the illegal commodity, and sometimes
requires relocation of the center of operations. In the study, most police
indicated the not unreasonable belief that the seizure of illegally possessed weapons would reduce crimes of violence. One official reported an
amusing practice of "leaking" to suspected gambling or vice centers false
reports of imminent raids in the expectation that the inconvenience
and loss of income caused by the temporary cessation of activities or
the removal of the operation to another location were deterrents of at
least equal force to the modest fines imposed by the courts on conviction
-which had the further advantage of requiring only a very modest
expenditure of police effort and manpower. The study points up that
when the police seize contraband or conduct aggressive crime-preventive
type searches, as ends in themselves, serious questions may arise concerning the applicability or effectiveness of present judicial standards
which are ordinarily couched in terms of the inadmissibility of evidence
seized unlawfully.
Mr. McIntyre's analysis of the matter of search and seizure also
makes clear that there are a variety of circumstances and factors which
may affect the lawfulness of police action in a given case. The sections
of his report in which he classifies the subject of search and seizure into
various subdivisions and discusses separately the legal considerations
applicable to each make this middle section of the book a highly useful
aid to the trial practitioner. The section also contains a thoughtful
analysis of the problems surrounding the conduct of searches incident to
arrests and of so-called consent searches.
Because the field of search and seizure is one in which the courts have
already taken an active interest, this section of the book will be more
useful as a statement of the law than its companions; but it also will be
helpful to those concerned with the needs for improvement in practices
in these areas.
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Professor Rotenberg's report on police "encouragement" of crime is,
in a sense, the most academic treatment in the book-and, at the same
time (perhaps for this reason) the most thought-provoking. The study
focuses primarily on the special problems of law enforcement in crimes
such as prostitution, homosexuality, and illegal traffic in narcotics or
liquor-the so-called "victimless" crimes which are rarely reported by a
"victim" and which ordinarily must be uncovered and prosecuted by the
police without much outside assistance.
The only practicable means for ferreting out and effectively prosecuting such crimes is for the police (or some person acting with them) to
simulate a false interest in participation in such a crime until enough
evidence is gathered to make an arrest and to obtain a conviction. Professor Rotenberg's study indicates that when using these techniques, the
police usually have the objective of making arrests and initiating successful prosecutions if crimes are uncovered. This reflects a police judgment, apparently, that the technique is not effective as a direct crime
deterrent and the fact, in the case of narcotic violations, that the crime
is so serious that it does not seem appropriate to terminate police activity
short of such arrest and conviction. That the police purposes are not
fully served short of successful prosecution would create special problems
if the courts impose restrictions or standards in this area, as they have in
interrogation after arrest and search and seizure.
However, the area of police "encouragement" of crime is one in which
the courts have expressed relatively little interest, so that present police
techniques are fashioned largely without judicially established norms, at
least outside the field encompassed by the defense of entrapment.
The technique of "encouragement" ordinarily requires the police officer or agent falsely to indicate in some appropriate fashion to the potential accomplice the apparent interest of the officer in participating in the
criminal venture and to continue the pretext far enough that sufficient
evidence is obtained that a crime has been committed-usually the one
"encouraged" by the police.
Professor Rotenberg points out the special problems encountered with
the use of this technique against crimes such as prostitution or homosexuality where frequently the gravamen of the offense charged is the
solicitation. For obvious reasons, the police in such cases must stop short
of participating in the completed crime-an option open to them in the
illegal purchase of drugs or liquor. The consequence is that the legal
effectiveness of the technique frequently involves questions-in the
parlance of the law of contracts-of whether given conduct was an offer
or an acceptance-and the officer must learn to restrain his expressions
of interest so that the solicitation does not travel from him to the defendant, rather than the other way.
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Where the substantive crime charged is not essentially the solicitation,
the technique of encouragement is considerably more effective. There the
legality of the practice is usually subject to challenge only within the
ambit of the rather severely limited and rarely successful defense of
entrapment. Courts also manifest traditionally greater tolerance for
police methods in dealing with crimes where the technique is used-such
as drug traffic-a tolerance reflecting general acceptance of the belief
that drug traffic is an extremely serious crime and judicial recognition
of the special difficulties and dangers which the police face in gathering
evidence in the case of such crimes.
Professor Rotenberg discusses the question of whether-short of entrapment-there are inherent contradictions or ethical problems in police
encouragement of crime, commenting upon the fact that such practices
involve varying degrees of deception by the police and sometimes even
a limited involvement in the illegal enterprise itself. It seems doubtful,
however, that public concern will rise sufficiently high in the near future
to result in the judicial formulation of standards in this field. However,
some redefinition of the doctrine of entrapment seems to be more urgently
needed. As presently applied in most states, Professor Rotenberg points
out it prohibits only grossly inappropriate practices.
Professor Rotenberg concludes his report with a discussion of certain
aspects of "encouragement" which raise important policy issues, to which
he invites the attention of both law enforcement agencies and the legal
profession. He suggests, first, that further studies be made to determine
whether the use of encouragement techniques should not be confined to
those crimes where the technique is most needed and most effective. He
suggests further the need for a more precise articulation of criteria to
determine the quantity and quality of information which the police should
have concerning a suspect in order to make it appropriate to use the
technique upon him. Finally, he suggests that further inquiry into actual
police practices should be made to determine whether there is a need for
control of particular modes of encouragement.
As a whole, all of the reports in the book, Detection of Crime, will be
useful to the legal profession primarily because of the extremely capable
job of classification and definition done by the authors and because of
their suggestions for further study and the better formulation of standards. There are limitations in the work which are inherent in the nature
of the study and not the product of faults of workmanship. For example,
the report made of the data relied upon is so limited and the time when
the studies were made is now so remote that the studies have little or no
utility as a primary source of what police practices in these areas actually
are. Moreover-with the possible exception of the section on Search and
Seizures-the book will be a disappointment to the practitioner whose
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interest is confined to finding the applicable law. Detection of Crime is
not a legal textbook nor even a study of police practices in that sense,
nor, of course, was it intended as such.
.As a study of the fields covered with a view to surveying the practices,
seeing the problems and starting to map the path to their solutions, the
book is a valuable contribution in a most important area of the administration of justice.
Gilbert J. Helwig, Esq.**

By Lon L. Fuller.t Stanford: Stanford University Press,
1967. Pp. xiii, 142. $4.50.

LEGAL FICTIONS.

Man's reasoning process has baffled the profound scholars of every age.
Writers in every field have endeavored to explain the process although the
human mind itself can merely fathom its wonders. The problem of
semantics has often tended to confuse more than clarify the subject.
Therefore, it is a welcomed bit of insight that the legal community is
offered in this provocative book by Professor Fuller.
A fiction may be either a statement propounded with a complete or
partial consciousness of its falsity, or a false statement recognized as having utility. Current usage permits such a definition embracing two entirely discordant elements. To clarify this paradox, the author ponders
the three basic questions to be faced: 1) what is a legal fiction?; 2) what
motives give rise to the legal fiction?; and 3) is fiction an indispensable
instrument of human thinking?
Professor Fuller first distinguishes the fiction from its relatives, the
lie, the erroneous conclusion, the truth, the presumption and the expedient. The rationale of the fiction is that it serves to reconcile a legal
result with some expressed or assumed premise. It is the cement that is
always at hand to hold together the weak spots in our intellectual structure. In dealing with the motives for the fiction, Professor Fuller distinguishes between expository and emotive fictions; historical and nonhistorical fictions; apologetic and habitual fictions; general and special
fictions; and the procedural and statutory fictions.
To understand the function of the legal fiction, one must undertake an
examination of the processes of human thought generally. Professor
Fuller has, in the course of such examination, systematically gleaned
seeds of wisdom from Hans Vaihinger's book, Die Philosophie des Als
** Professor of Law, Duquesne University.

t

professor of Law, Harvard University.
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Ob, which considered the fiction in all the departments of human intellectual activity. Vaihinger concluded that the mind is not merely receptive, but it is also appropriative and elaborative, and that our minds have
the capacity for altering, simplifying and rearranging reality by converting new experiences into familiar terms.
The legal mind uses this process in its quest for balance. The pressure
of new cases, presenting varied situations of fact, will in time compel a
judge either to clarify rules previously obscure, or to draw with some
precision the line at which the constraints of law leave off. The fiction
forces upon our attention the relation between theory and fact, between
concept and reality and reminds us of the complexity of that relation.
The danger of the fiction lies in its possible misuse by the failure to
eliminate it from our final reckoning, but its true mystery consists not in
the fact that we can reach right results with wrong ideas, but in the fact
that the human mind, in dealing with reality, is able to go so far beyond
its capacity for analyzing its own processes. One of Professor Fuller's
significant conclusions is that it is a legal word, the word "judgment,"
which has come in common speech to express precisely the sense of tact
and balance for which the human mind searches.
The author claims only that Legal Fictionsmay serve as a reminder for
the legal scholar that the legal fiction is a more complex phenomenon
than he is ordinarily inclined to suppose and more generally, as a reminder
that judges do not simply "make" law in the simple and direct way
modern commentators often seem to assume. For the reader untrained in
the law, Legal Fictions will offer useful perspectives into the nature of
legal thought.
One may find the treatment of the subject matter of the book to be
somewhat intellectually sophisticated, but even a cursory reading and
momentary reflection will challenge the reader's preconceived notions of
what is fact and what is theory under the law. Professor Fuller's book
may never be listed among the top ten on the best seller fiction list, but
it is certainly no misstatement to say that Legal Fictions will be excellent and worthwhile reading for all those interested in the law and
especially for those desirous of understanding legal reasoning.
Hon. Glenn E. Mencer*
* President Judge, Forty-Eighth Judicial District of Pennsylvania.-
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By W. Barton Leach.t Lawrence: The University of Kansas Press, 1967. Pp. xii, 94. $2.25.
Sir, the law is as I say it is, and so it has been laid down ever
since the law began; and we have several set forms which are
held as law, and so held and used for good reason, though we
cannot at present remember that reason.
Chief Justice Fortescue, Y.B. 36 Hen. VI, 25b-26 (1458).

PROPERTY LAW INDICTED!

With this age-old quote from the Year Books Professor Leach sums
up that which is wrong with the present property law and sets the tone
for his short work. This slim, but potent volume, is a transcript of some
lectures delivered by Professor Leach at the School of Law at the University of Kansas in March, 1966. Nothing new or startling is set out in
the book, but it does bring together in one place many of the problems
of the current property law and some efforts to modernize that law.
Sir William Blackstone and his Commentaries On English Law are
tabbed as one of the basic causes of the stagnation of property law
development. The idea that any change in the property law would cause
the whole system of property to tumble is attributed to Blackstone.
Professor Leach calls this the "Medes-And-Persian Syndrome."' Chancellor Kent of New York, writing the first great law book in AmericaCommentaries-is accused of slavishly following Blackstone and thus
further stifling property law development. Marshall, Holmes and Cardozo
are all called very bad property lawyers. Professor Leach is of the opinion
that "[t]here seems to be some essential antipathy between property law
'2
and greatness."
The American Law Institute and the Restatement of Property Law are
accused by Professor Leach of being another obstacle to reform, his feeling being that the Restatement should both set out the law as it is and
as it should be. So far as property law is concerned, the Institute has
banned criticism of the established law. The retroactive effect of the
changing case law is also cited as a bar to major developments in the
property law field. However, with recent Supreme Court decisions which
have set out the times from which these decisions will be effective on
other cases, Professor Leach feels that there has been a significant breakthrough. Judges hearing property cases can now hold that their decisions
need not be applied retroactively if to do so would cause great injustice.
Professor Leach takes a position that the judiciary has a duty to overrule bad case law where the reasons for continuing a line of authority
have disappeared. He points to the celebrated case of Fox v. Snow,' where
t Professor of Law, Harvard University.
1. W. B. LEACH, PROPERTY LAW INDICTED!

2. Id. at 12.
3. 6 N.J. 12, 76 A.2d 877 (1950).

7 (1967)

[hereinafter cited as LEACH].
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the New Jersey court automatically ruled that a testamentary gift of a
bank account in absolute terms to a husband with the provision that a
niece was to get whatever was left over on the husband's death gave
nothing to the niece. The gift to the niece was stricken as being repugnant
to the absolute gift to the husband. While it is apparent to most lawyers
that this result is dictated by case law, Professor Leach asks, "Why
should it be so?"
Some specific suggested reforms are set out in the volume. The foremost reform suggested is that probate courts should assume a greater
power to reform wills and trusts which outrageously neglect the proper
concern for the natural objects of bounty of the testator or settlor. This
especially is so, says Professor Leach, where the instrument denies the
right to invade principal, leaving the object of the donor's bounty with
a dwindling income caused by inflation and taxation through the years.
In this regard, he points to the situation of Lord Louis Mountbatten and
Lady Mountbatten where an Act of Parliament was required to permit
Lady Mountbatten and other persons similarly situated to anticipate income from a trust and to make rearrangement of the trusts to meet the
practical needs of the time. Professor Leach feels that this result could
have been achieved by judicial interpretation, but that the courts failed,
principally on the thesis that the change was up to the legislature. This
Professor Leach refers to as the "Pontius Pilate Syndrome" 4 of the
judiciary. Professor Leach advocates the courts' taking the bull by the
horns to permit invasion of principal when income is not sufficient to
meet the needs of the primary beneficiary. Similarly he suggests that
various unreasonable prohibitions annexed to a gift should not be given
effect. The adage that the court has no power to remake the testator's
will is ignored.
Another bugaboo to orderly development is the existence, in greater or
less degree, of various archaic principals such as the Rule in Shelly's Case
and the Doctrine of Worthier Title. He points to the case of Doctor v.
Hughes,5 wherein Judge Cardozo ".

.

. with patent misunderstandings of

property law" 6 declared that the doctrine was not a rule of law in New
York but a rule of construction which resulted in the doctrine being applied to personal property, an extension of an already bad situation.
Professor Leach states that the anti-lapse statutes, while commendable
in aim, can stand some revision which would more clearly cover various
situations including their effect on powers of appointment. Another major
stumbling block to orderly evolution of property law is held to be the
rules of construction used to interpret instruments. Referring to the
4. LEAc- at 35.
5. 225 N.Y. 305, 122 N.E. 221 (1919).
6. LEAcH at 55.
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rules of construction Professor Leach finds that "[t]he cases present a
nauseating collection of judicial garbage."' 7 He points out that the phrase
"die without issue" has been given four different meanings.
As to how property law can be effectively reformed, Professor Leach
is not particularly positive. He suggests that each practitioner must add
his weight to the reform movement, but he acknowledges that lawyers as
a group are rather 'conservative, especially in the property law field, and
are slow to embrace any sweeping changes. One great advance would be
the institution of a title registration system (the Torrens system), but he
points out that the institution of this system might require a great
sacrifice by the legal profession in order to make it inexpensive.
Professor Leach has much to say about the Rule against Perpetuities
and urges that it be made clearer and more capable of application, unshackled by the thousands of cases which have interpreted it. What he
seems to suggest is the application of the doctrine of Cy Pres to private
gifts where a court finds a violation of the rule.
This short volume, while not a working textbook as such, graphically
brings to the reader various problems in the property law field and some
suggested reforms. Some of those reform measures probably will disturb
old time property lawyers but the book can serve to bring to the legal
profession an understanding that property law should evolve with our
social and economic cycles.
John P. Papuga, Esq.*
7. Id. at 60.
* B.A., Rice University; LL.B., University of Pittsburgh. Member of the Pennsylvania

